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The landmark Supreme Court decision Miranda v. Arizona,
recognized a defendant's right to be informed of the rights guaranteed
by the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination clause,2 including the
right to counsel. The Miranda Court realized that a suspect may feel
compelled to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege while in official
detention.3 The Court held that the police must read the now-familiar
warnings to a subject in custodial interrogation before he can waive
his rights. 4  Therefore, the Court in Miranda chose to strike the
balance between effective law enforcement and protecting a subject's
constitutional rights at the point of informing the subject of his rights,
including his right to counsel, once he is under custodial interrogation.
The crucial question then and now remains-how does a Fifth
Amendment right to counsel protects a subject from this compulsion to
confess?
Miranda has been criticized for decreasing the confession rate
and placing a burden upon effective law enforcement.5 In Moran v.
Burbine,6 the Supreme Court refused to extend Miranda further to
provide the subject with additional protections. 7  Many states
expressly rejected Burbine, however, and extended the Miranda
protections through their respective state constitutions. These states,
echoing the Miranda Court's concern over coerced confessions, have
attempted to prevent coercion by providing the subject with more
information once under custodial interrogation." New York has taken
a slightly different approach toward extending Mirandds protections.
New York focuses not on the quantity of information supplied to the
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. The Fifth Amendment reads in relevant part: "No person... shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const., Amend. V.
3. The Court emphasized that "the modern practice of in-custody interrogation is psycho-
logically rather than physically oriented," Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448, and "[t]he difficulty in
depicting what transpires at such interrogations stems from the fact that in this country they
have largely taken place incommunicado." Id. at 445. The Court described incommunicado
interrogations as those occurring "in a room in which [the subject] was cut off from the outside
world." Id.
4. The Court held that the police must inform the subject that he has the right to remain
silent, that any statement he makes may be used against him, and that he has the right to have a
retained or appointed attorney present during interrogation. Id. at 444.
5. See, for example, Stephen J. Markman, The Fifth Amendment and Custodial
Questioning: A Response to "Reconsidering Miranda," 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 938,945-47 (1987).
6. 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
7. See id.; Part III.A.
8. The Fifth Amendment rights guaranteed by the Miranda decision are applied to the
states via the Fourteenth Amendment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). See also Part IV.
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subject in reaching his decision to confess, but rather on the nature
and quality of the suspect's final decision.
The New York model is precisely the type of protection that the
Miranda Court contemplated; therefore, all the states should adopt
this approach. Part II of this Note explains the central concerns,
reasoning, and holding of the landmark Miranda decision. Part III
examines how the Burbine Court betrayed both the letter and spirit of
Miranda. Part IV describes how many states have used their own
constitutions in an effort to correct the results of the flawed Burbine
decision. Part IV also demonstrates that these states' efforts have
failed to achieve the goals envisioned by the Miranda Court because
although states struck the appropriate balance between individual
and state rights, they used the wrong scale. Part V describes the New
York approach and demonstrates that it fully effectuates Miranda's
goals by ensuring that the subject's decision to confess is rational and
uncoerced. Part V concludes that the policy concerns and implications
of adopting the New York rule nationwide do not present impractical
or undesirable barriers.
II. MRANDA V. ARIZONA: A MEANS TO AN END
A. The Concern Over Incommunicado Interrogation
The primary concern the Miranda Court identified, and the
recurring theme of its opinion, is that custodial interrogations are
inherently coercive.9 The Court noted that interrogations take place
in private; therefore, courts lack any knowledge of what actually
transpires in the interrogation rooms.10 An examination of police
interrogation manuals-sources that codify interrogation proce-
dures-further concerned the Court. The Court began by noting that
the manuals instruct officers that the key psychological factor to a
successful interrogation is privacy.,, It noted several other instructions
9. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457-58; note 3 and accompanying text. One commentator ex-
panded on this observation and noted that "[clustodial interrogation brings psychological pressure
to bear for the specific purpose of overcoming the suspect's unwillingness to talk, and it is
therefore inherently compelling within the meaning of the fifth amendment." Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 435, 446 (1987).
10. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448.
11. The Court noted that the manuals dictate:
The subject should be deprived of every psychological advantage. In his own home he
may be confident, indignant, or recalcitrant. He is more keenly aware of his rights and
more reluctant to tell of his indiscretions or criminal behavior within the walls of his
19941 891
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in the manuals designed to create an atmosphere of intimidation and
coercion. 12 In addition, the manuals specifically advised officers to
discourage subjects from pursuing their desires to speak with an
attorney or a relative.3
The Court concluded that these manuals strive to create an
intimidating interrogation setting with no distractions and an experi-
ence in which the subject is totally deprived of outside support.14 The
Court found this atmosphere inherently coercive. 15 It therefore
concluded that the subject must be informed of certain rights to help
dispel this coercion and to limit custodial interrogation properly.16
The Court also emphasized that this coercion is not limited to
the uneducated or those unaware of their rights.17  Commentators
home. Moreover his family and friends are nearby, their presence lending moral support.
In his own office, the investigator possesses all the advantages. The atmosphere suggests
the invincibility of the forces of the law.
Id. at 449-50 (footnote omitted).
12. For instance, the manuals direct officers to display an air of confidence in assuming the
suspect's guilt. Id. at 450. In addition, they state that the most important qualities in an interro-
gator are patience and perseverance, leaving the subject with "no prospect of surcease" and "no
respite from the atmosphere of domination." Id. at 450-51 (footnote omitted).
13. One manual instructs:
[Tihe interrogator should respond by suggesting that the subject first tell the truth to the
interrogator himself rather than get anyone else involved in the matter. If the request is
for an attorney, the interrogator may suggest that the subject save himself or his family
the expense of any such professional service, particularly if he is innocent of the offense
under investigation. The interrogator may also add, "Joe, I'm only looking for the truth,
and if you're telling the truth, that's it. You can handle this by yourself."
Id. at 454 (quoting Fred E. Inbau and John E. Reid, Criminal Interrogation and Confessions 112
(Williams & Wilkins, 1962)).
14. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455. One commentator asserts that this conclusion is the primary
basis for the Miranda Court's finding that custodial interrogation is inherently coercive.
Professor White states:
The Miranda majority based its conclusion that suspects subjected to police interrogation
would believe that there were legal or extralegal sanctions for a failure to answer ... on
an examinatign of the interrogation tactics recommended in police manuals. As Professor
Caplan recognizes, these tactics were designed to place the suspect at a disadvantage.
Welsh S. White, Defending Miranda: A Reply to Professor Caplan, 39 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1986)
(footnote omitted).
15. The Court buttressed its assertion by describing several cases in which subjects
succumbed to this pressure although they might have exercised their Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination if the coercion had been dispelled. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 456. The first
case involved a 19-year-old defendant who was a heroin addict and described as a 'near mental
defective." Id. (citing Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 307-10 (1963)). The defendant in the
second case was a woman who confessed after an officer urged her to "cooperate" to prevent the
authorities from taking her children. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 456 (citing Lynumn v. Illinois, 372
U.S. 528 (1963)). The third case involved a defendant who repeatedly requested to phone his wife
or attorney during the interrogation. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 456 (citing Haynes v. Washington, 373
U.S. 503 (1963)).
16. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
17. The Court explained that "[ilt is not just the subnormal or woefully ignorant who
succumb to an interrogator's imprecations . . . that the interrogation will continue until a
confession is obtained or that silence in the face of an accusation is itself damning and will bode ill
when presented to a jury." Id. at 468. Commentators have agreed with the Court on this point,
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agree that subjects who are fully aware of their rights need to know
that the police are equally aware of suspects' rights and will honor
them.18 The Court in Miranda therefore concluded that a subject's
knowledge of his rights is insufficient to effect a valid waiver of those
rights and that a subject may waive his Miranda rights only if that
waiver is made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.19
B. The Warnings as a First Step
Miranda's analysis cannot end with its bare-bones holding,
however, because the Court's intent regarding the nature and function
of the warnings is crucial to determine whether later decisions are
consistent with Miranda's principles. The Miranda opinion made
clear that the warnings should be considered only as a minimum
starting point to dispel any degree of coercion that the subject may
feel in an incommunicado setting. The Court specifically encouraged
the states to create even greater protections for the accused than
those provided by the warnings.20 Thus, to effectuate fully the right to
silence embodied in the privilege against self-incrimination, the warn-
ings were imposed as a minimum means to show that the subject
voluntarily waived his rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments.21 Additionally, the Court's own statement supports the inter-
pretation that the actual presence of counsel during interrogation
would be optimal to ensure that the waiver was voluntary.22 In
Miranda, the Court articulated the foundational requirements to
noting that a subject's knowledge of his rights does not necessarily have any relation to the
coercion he will feel under custodial interrogation. See, for example, Schulhofer, 54 U. Chi. L.
Rev. at 447 (cited in note 9). They have explained that although an educated subject may be
aware of his rights, he also will knov; that the police can subject him to extended periods of inter-
rogation and that, practically speaking, his silence can operate against him. Id.
18. Schulhofer, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 447 (cited in note 9). See also White, 39 Vand. L. Rev.
at 6 (cited in note 14).
19. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
20 The Court stated:
We encourage Congress and the States to continue their laudable search for increasingly
effective ways of protecting the rights of the individual while promoting efficient enforce-
ment of our criminal laws. However, unless we are shown other procedures which are at
least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a
continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following safeguards must be observed.
Id. at 467.
21. The Court specifically used this language. It stated that 'unless other fully effective
means are devised to inform accused persons" of their rights, the Miranda warnings must be
given. Id. at 444.
22. The Court stated that "[tihe presence of counsel... would be the adequate protective
device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the
privilege. His presence would insure that statements made in the government-established
atmosphere are not the product of compulsion." Id. at 466.
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protect the Fifth Amendment privilege and listed additional
protections that would prevent coercion.2 3 Additionally, it invited the
states to fashion their own, more protective requirements.
24
Additional aspects of the Miranda opinion demonstrate the
Court's intent that the warnings should serve merely as a means to
protect the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination; they
should serve to strike a balance between the subject's rights and effi-
cient law enforcement in favor of the subject.2 5 First, the Court stated
that the decision ensures that the constitutional guarantee against
self-incrimination does not become a "form of words" in the hands of
government officials .2  Therefore, the Miranda Court never intended
a mere recitation of the warnings alone as a goal or result of the
decision. Specifically, the Court made clear that it intended precisely
the opposite. The warnings serve not as a "form of words," an end in
themselves, but rather as a means of effecting the constitutional
guarantees.
Second, the Court held that although the subject may have
answered questions or volunteered information, he may indicate in
any manner and at any time that he wishes to exercise his constitu-
tional rights.27  Certainly, rights that are invoked easily cannot be
waived easily2 8 because the principles behind one are flatly contradic-
tory to the principles behind the other.2 9  By providing for an easy
invocation of the rights, and thereby implying a strict requirement to
prove waiver of them,30 the Court demonstrated a lesser concern for
23. In fact, only two terms earlier, the Court expressly stated that "[o]ur Constitution...
strikes the balance in favor of the right of the accused to be advised by his lawyer of his privilege
against self-incrimination." Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488 (1964).
24. In addition to explaining the effect on the compulsive atmosphere, the Court noted
several collateral benefits provided by the attorney's presence. For instance, if law enforcement
officers successfully coerce the suspect, the attorney may testify to that fact in court.
Furthermore, counsel's presence during an interrogation helps guarantee that the subject gives
an accurate statement to the police and, in turn, that both the police and prosecution accurately
report that statement. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470.
25. See generally White, 39 Vand. L. Rev. at 6 (cited in note 14).
26. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
27. Id. at 444-45.
28. Indeed, the Court has stated in an often-quoted passage that "'courts indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver' of fundamental constitutional rights." Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937)).
29 If the courts have struck the balance in favor of the subject in providing a broad
interpretation of invocation, the same preference evidently would be given for waiver; that is, the
balance would be struck in favor of the subject and waiver would be given a narrow in-
terpretation.
30. In fact, the Court expressly required a strict test for waiver. The Court held that "[t]he
defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently," Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, and that 'a heavy burden rests on the




efficient law enforcement in the face of its great concern for the sub-
ject's constitutional rights.
Thus, the Miranda opinion reflects the Court's deep concern
over the inherently coercive, incommunicado atmosphere of custodial
interrogations and the intimidating techniques suggested by police
interrogation manuals. To overcome this coercive atmosphere, which
exists regardless of the particular subject's knowledge of his rights,
the Court required that officers inform the subject of certain constitu-
tional rights. The Court intended its holding to serve only as a start-
ing point, one way of many to reach the goal of relieving the inherent
compulsion of incommunicado interrogation and giving full effect to
the privilege against self-incrimination. This latter point has been
neglected, forgotten, or twisted hopelessly in many subsequent
decisions; therefore, it is the one factor the state courts should hold in
the highest regard when crafting their future decisions.
III. MORAN v. BURBINE: MIRANDA AS THE END IN ITSELF
A. Miranda Becomes the First and Final Step
In 1986, the Supreme Court in Moran v. Burbine3' drastically
departed from the principles underlying Miranda. Police detained
Brian Burbine under suspicion of murder.32 An attorney retained by
Burbine's sister telephoned the police station and asked whether his
client would be interrogated that night. The police informed the
attorney that Burbine would be questioned in the morning. 3 Burbine
did not request an attorney, nor did the police inform him that an
attorney had been retained for him and had contacted the police. 3
4
After the officers informed Burbine of his Miranda rights, he signed a
waiver and confessed to the murder.35 Burbine claimed that the
police's failure to inform him of the availability of retained counsel
31. 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
32. Id. at 416. The police originally arrested Burbine in connection with a burglary, but the
police had obtained evidence connecting him to a murder earlier that year. Id.
33. Id. at 416-17. Burbine's sister, unaware that Burbine was a suspect in the murder
investigation, called the Public Defender's office to obtain legal assistance for her brother on the
burglary charge. That evening, an attorney from the Public Defender's office telephoned the
police station, identified herself, and stated that she would represent Burbine if the police
intended to place him in a lineup or question him. The police told the attorney that they were
through with Burbine for the evening and would not be questioning him. Less than an hour later,
however, the officers began interrogating Burbine about the murder. Id.
34. Id. at 417.
35. Id. at 417-18.
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rendered his waiver invalid; therefore, he moved to suppress his
statements.3 6  In a six-to-three opinion, the Court stated that
Burbine's waiver of his Miranda rights was knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary and therefore valid . 7 The Court's rationale and its ultimate
holding blatantly contradict the guiding principles provided in the
Miranda decision. The Burbine Court ignored Miranda's concerns and
viewed the warnings not as a means of decreasing the coercion of an
incommunicado interrogation, but rather as ends in themselves.
The Court based its holding on its view that events occurring
outside the presence of the suspect and entirely unknown to him have
no bearing on his capacity to comprehend and knowingly relinquish a
constitutional right.38 The Miranda Court, however, did not focus on,
and in fact expressly rejected, the sufficiency of a subject's knowledge
and comprehension of his constitutional rights as a consideration.39
The Miranda Court's greatest concern was the inherent coercion in
incommunicado interrogation that arises from the privacy and secrecy
of these proceedings; this concern is totally independent of the
suspect's knowledge of his rights.4° Even events occurring outside the
presence of the suspect and those entirely unknown to him concerned
the Miranda Court, because seclusion and lack of awareness
contribute to the coercion that the entire Miranda opinion aimed to
dispel. Therefore, the Burbine Court's approval of this seclusion, by
considering its consequences consistent with one's constitutional
rights, is contrary to Miranda's goals.41
Although the Burbine Court conceded that informing Burbine
that a retained attorney had contacted the station would have been
useful to him and might have affected his decision to confess, the
Court found this irrelevant and summarily decided that Burbine's
waiver was uncoerced.42 This finding is totally inconsistent with the
Miranda Court's opinion that considered relevant any factor that may
36. Id. at 418.
37. Id. at 421.
38. Id. at 422.
39. See notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
40. See Part II.A.
41. One commentator has agreed, asserting that "Burbine betrays the spirit of Miranda by
placing a judicial seal of approval on official deception, thereby encouraging incommunicado
interrogation...." Note, The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 100, 126 (1986).
Robert B. Mann, Brian Burbine's lead counsel before the Supreme Court, summarized the issue
by stating 'You can't just take the defendant off the streets and keep him away from everybody...."
Graeme Browning, Moran v. Burbine The Magic of Miranda, 72 ABA J. 58,59 (Jan. 1986).
42. Burbine, 475 U.S. at 422-23. The Court stated: "Once it is determined that a suspect's
decision not to rely on his rights was uncoerced, that he at all times knew he could stand mute
and request a lawyer, and that he was aware of the State's intention to use his statements to
secure a conviction, the analysis is complete...." Id.
896 [47:889
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affect a subject's decision to succumb." Therefore, the Court's
admission that Burbine might have exercised his constitutional rights
if he knew of the availability of an attorney should have sent a clear
signal that elements of coercion may have existed that had not been
dispelled, and thus Mirandds goal may not have been achieved in this
case.
The majority in Burbine entirely ignored this signal, however,
because it failed to recognize the purpose of the Miranda warnings."
Although the Miranda Court intended the warnings as a means to
dispel coercion and to strike the balance in favor of the subject, 5 the
majority in Burbine considered the warnings themselves sufficient to
protect the suspect's constitutional rights and struck the balance in
favor of efficient law enforcement." The Burbine majority apparently
considered the Miranda warnings as both the beginning and end of
the government's role in advancing and protecting a suspect's
constitutional rights; after the police recite the Miranda warnings, the
constitutional mandate is satisfied and nothing more need be done.
The Burbine Court thus allowed, and indeed encouraged, the
proclamations in the Constitution to become precisely the "form of
words" in the hands of government officials that the Miranda Court
expressly intended to avoid4' and did nothing to decrease the coercion
of incommunicado interrogation, the Miranda decision's chief
concern.48
43. See note 15 for cases in which the Court set aside convictions when coercion played a
role in obtaining the subject's waiver and confession. In approving these reversals, the Court
expressed its concern that "[i]n other settings, these individuals might have exercised their
constitutional rights." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 456.
44. The dissent, written by Justice Stevens and joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall,
offered another reason why the majority may have ignored this signal. Justice Stevens wrote
that the opinion makes sense only if the majority views the lawyer as a "nettlesome obstacle" to
law enforcement rather than as an "aid to the understanding and protection of constitutional
rights...." Burbine, 475 U.S. at 468 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
45. See notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
46. The Court in Burbine concluded that "[b]ecause [Burbine's] voluntary decision to speak
was made with full awareness and comprehension of all the information Miranda requires the po-
lice to convey, the waivers were valid." Burbine, 475 U.S. at 424 (emphasis added).
47. See text accompanying note 26.
48. In addition, at least one commentator has argued that the Miranda Court's explicit
requirement that a waiver be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent demonstrates that proof of a
mere recitation of the warnings, and the subject's comprehension of them, is not at all the end of
the analysis. See Reinaldo Pascual, Comment, A Farewell to Miranda: Knowing and Intelligent
Waiver After Moran v. Burbine, 20 Creighton L. Rev. 111, 127-28 (1986). Pascual reasons that a
narrow interpretation of "intelligent," such as the interpretation the majority in Burbine
appeared to adopt, requires only that the subject understand his rights and the options available
to him. Id. at 127. This interpretation, however, renders the requirement that a waiver be
"intelligent" no different than the requirement that it be knowing. Id. (footnote omitted).
Therefore, the Miranda Court likely intended the intelligent prong to encompass much more,
including perhaps the consequences of a waiver, which would require that the suspect be provided
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B. The Court's Concern Over Muddying Miranda's Clear Waters
The Burbine Court misinterpreted and therefore misapplied
the Miranda holding. It viewed the Miranda warnings as ends in
themselves and therefore refused to create a rule that would require
the police to do more than simply read the warnings to the suspect.
The Burbine Court also justified its refusal to expand a suspect's
constitutional protection on another similarly flawed ground. The
Court justified its refusal to impose additional obligations on the
police by stating that policy and practical concerns, 49 and the resulting
muddying of Miranda's clear waters,50 counseled against such a rule.
The Court then attempted to soften its holding by allowing the states
to address individually any concerns they may have for the suspect's
constitutional rights.51 A closer examination of this reasoning reveals
that the Court's rationale is misguided, its concerns are overstated,
and its suggestion of individual state action has increased the
departure from Miranda's basic principles.
First, the Burbine Court's rationale that requiring the police to
inform a defendant of an attorney's efforts to reach him will muddy
Mirandds otherwise clear waters is neither a sound nor justifiable
basis for declining to adopt such a rule. As discussed in Part II, the
Miranda Court was concerned primarily with protecting the suspect's
constitutional rights. The Miranda Court recognized that full protec-
with additional information that could substantially affect the decision whether to waive his
rights. Id. at 127-28.
Obviously, one of the consequences of waiver to Burbine was that a retained attorney, ready
and willing to represent him, would remain unknown and therefore of no assistance to him.
Certainly, this information could have affected his decision to waive his rights. Therefore,
Burbine might have required this information to make an intelligent waiver. This approach
appears to recognize that the Miranda Court was concerned not only about the quantity of
information provided to the subject, but also the quality and rationality of the ultimate decision.
49. These concerns included:
To what extent should the police be held accountable for knowing that the accused has
counsel? Is it enough that someone in the stationhouse knows, or must the interrogating
officer himself know of counsel's efforts to contact the suspect? Do counsel's efforts to talk
to the suspect concerning one criminal investigation trigger the obligation to inform the
defendant before interrogation may proceed on a wholly separate matter?
Burbine, 475 U.S. at 425.
50. The Court argued that:
While such a rule might add marginally to Miranda's goal of dispelling the compulsion in-
herent in custodial interrogation, overriding practical considerations counsel against its
adoption. ... "One of the principal advantages" of Miranda is the ease and clarity of its
application.... We have little doubt that [creating such a rule] would have the inevitable
consequence of muddying Miranda's otherwise relatively clear waters.
Id. at 425 (citations omitted).
51. The Court explained that "[nlothing we say today disables the States from adopting
different requirements for the conduct of its employees and officials as a matter of state law.' Id.
at 428.
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tion of a suspect's constitutional rights and efficient law enforcement
are competing interests and concluded that the balance should be
struck in favor of the suspect. 2 Therefore, creating a rule of utmost
clarity and imposing a duty on police that could be discharged with
absolute certainty were not the Miranda Court's ultimate, or even
subsidiary, goals. The Burbine Court's refusal to adopt a rule that
would further protect a suspect's constitutional rights because it
would decrease the clarity of the Miranda holding thus is fundamen-
tally at odds with the most basic principles underlying the Miranda
decision.6
Second, Miranda never was intended to be crystal clear or
immune from "muddying." Therefore, both the reasoning of the
Miranda decision and practical experience reveal that the
Burbine majority's concern over muddying Miranda's waters is
misplaced. Many questions regarding the application of
Miranda have been litigated, evidence that the rule is far from
clear and that police often do not know what Miranda requires.5
For instance, courts have struggled with, and given police
conflicting definitions of, the terms "interrogation"55  and
52. See notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
53. Commentators have agreed with this assertion, both in theory and in practice. For
instance, one commentator observed that the dissent in Burbine recognized that "Miranda was
intended not only as a guide for police officers, but also as a guide to the suspect being asked to
waive his constitutional rights." Althea Kuller, Note, Moran v. Burbine: Supreme Court
Tolerates Police Interference with the Attorney-Client Relationship, 18 Loyola U. Chi. L. J. 251,
274 (1986). Another commentator has argued that "providing attorney availability information
burdens only minimally, if at all, the police's investigatory function. On the other hand, this
information is essential for the intelligent exercise or waiver of the suspect's rights." Pascual, 20
Creighton L. Rev. at 141 (cited in note 48) (footnote omitted).
54. One commentator has noted the many ambiguities inherent in the Miranda holding:
To suggest that the Miranda procedures are clear is an overstatement. Before the police
read a suspect his Miranda rights, the suspect must be in "custody," and the police must
be "interrogating" the suspect....
In addition, many conflicts surround the adequacy of the warnings given, the conse-
quences of invoking Miranda rights, and the proper manner of waiving Mranda rights. ...
Daniel J. Lynch, Note, Moran v. Burbine: Constitutional Rights of Custodial Suspects, 34 Wayne
L. Rev. 331,352 n.111 (1987) (citations omitted). Another commentator has described Miranda as
"a major source of litigable issues in its own right." Markman, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 944 (cited in
note 5).
55. Courts have held "interrogation" to include express questioning and its functional
equivalent, defined as "any words or actions on the part of the police ... that the police should
know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Rhode Island v.
Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1979) (citation omitted). The court in United States v. Thierman, 678
F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1982), addressed the scope of this definition. The suspect had stated repeat-
edly his wish that none of his family or friends, particularly his girlfriend Pat, become involved
with his criminal investigation. He subsequently invoked his right to counsel. The police, within
earshot of the suspect, stated their intention to question the suspect's friends and that it was "too
bad" that Pat had to become involved. Over a strong dissent, the court rejected Thierman's claim
that the police knew this action would prompt Thierman's subsequent confession and held that
the police acts did not constitute interrogation. Id. at 1336.
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"custody,"' as well as the requirements for a valid waiver.57 In
fact, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari to two of these
cases,5 presumably because it senses the lack of clarity and the
resulting need to provide the lower courts with guidance on these
recurring issues. Accordingly, it appears that Miranda's waters were
never clear, and thus the Burbine majority's conclusion that requiring
the police to inform a suspect of an attorney's efforts to reach him will
muddy Miranda's otherwise clear waters is unjustified.
Finally, the Burbine majority's concern over the legal questions
that would arise if it recognized the new rule seems unnecessary. 9
First, there appears to be little, if any, difference between the first and
second questions that the Court identified: if the Court specifies the
extent to which the police will be held accountable for knowing the
suspect has counsel, this answer clearly encompasses whether it is
56. The Miranda Court defined "custody" to include those circumstances in which "a person
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. In Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977), the suspect was interro-
gated alone at a police station; however, the Court held that Mathiason was not in custody
because he had come to the police station voluntarily and was told that he was not under arrest
and was free to leave. In Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 325 (1969), police questioned the suspect in his
bedroom. The Court held that the suspect was in custody because he "was not free to go where he
pleased but was 'under arrest.'" Id. at 325. In United States v. Mesa, 638 F.2d 582 (3rd Cir. 1980),
however, the court appeared to reach a contrary holding. The suspect in Mesa barricaded himself
in a motel room. The police evacuated the adjacent rooms, surrounded the motel, informed the
suspect that they had a warrant for his arrest, and provided a hostage negotiator who engaged in
a three-and-one-half-hour telephone conversation with the suspect. The district court held that
the suspect was in custody; therefore, the Miranda warnings should have been read to him prior
to the telephone discussion. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the suspect was not
controlled by a police-dominated atmosphere and therefore was not in custody. Id. at 586. It is
difficult, however, to see how Mesa could have gone where he pleased.
Most recently, the Supreme Court of California held that a suspect was not in custody for the
purposes of invoking the Miranda requirements in People v. Stansbury, 846 P.2d 756 (Cal. 1993).
The police approached Stansbury's residence with guns drawn, but not visible, and asked him to
come to the police station to make a statement as a witness. Id. at 776. The court held that
Stansbury was not in custody because the police merely "invited," rather than "commanded,"
Stansbury to come to the police station, and he was free to leave the interview room at any time,
although he would have needed the assistance of the police because he was in a locked room in a
secured area of the station. Id. at 776.
57. In North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979), the suspect read a written statement
of his Miranda rights, then told the officers, "I will talk to you but I am not signing any form." Id.
at 371. The suspect then made incriminating statements. The state court held that the suspect's
statement and actions were insufficient to satisfy Miranda's requirement that a waiver be
explicit. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a valid waiver under Miranda may be
implicit. Id. at 373. The dissent read Miranda as holding precisely the opposite, requiring an
explicit waiver and mandating that any ambiguity be resolved in favor of the accused. Id. at 377.
In United States v. Davis, 36 M.J. 337 (C.M.A. 1993), the Court of Military Appeals con-
fronted, and rejected, the argument that the suspect's statement, "Maybe I should talk to a
lawyer," was a valid invocation of his right to counsel. Id. at 339-40.
58. United States v. Davis, 36 M.J. 337 (C.M.A. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 379 (1993);
People v. Stansbury, 846 P.2d 756 (Cal. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 380 (1993).
59. See note 49.
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sufficient that someone at the stationhouse knows. Additionally, the
Court partially answered this question when it addressed a related
issue fifteen years before Burbine. In Santobello v. New York °60 the
Court held a replacement prosecutor accountable for the details of a
plea bargain entered into by the former prosecutor.61 Thus, if the staff
of a government office has the responsibility of conveying information
to one another concerning the circumstances of the defendant's right
to trial, it logically follows that the police station staff should have the
duty to inform each other of information related to the suspect's
constitutional right to counsel. Even if the Court declines to accept
the former as an answer to the latter, however, Santobello is evidence
that the Court previously has been willing, and therefore should be
willing today, to address the scope of government accountability.
IV. THE STATES' RESPONSE: PUrING THE PROPER PIECES IN THE
WRONG PLACES
Many states have recognized that Burbine was a departure
from the principles and goals of Miranda and have followed the
Burbine majority's suggestion to adopt different rules under their
state constitutions' self-incrimination provisions to guide police be-
havior.61 Although the state courts profess a distaste for Burbine and
claim to be crafting rules that further protect a suspect's constitu-
tional rights in accord with Miranda, a closer examination reveals
that the states actually have deviated further from Miranda. The
states' rules appear to be based largely or solely on the facts of the
specific case that came before the court, resulting in a collection of
arbitrary rules that, although perhaps providing more protection than
Burbine, still fall short of fulfilling the Miranda Court's goals.
60. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
61. The defendant had agreed to plead guilty to the charge in exchange for the prosecutor's
promise to make no recommendation regarding the sentence. Id. at 258. At the sentencing
hearing, however, the original prosecutor had been replaced by one who was unaware of that
particular term of the plea bargain and subsequently recommended the maximum sentence. Id.
at 258-59. The Court held that the prosecution had breached its agreement, stating that "[t]he
staff lawyers in a prosecutor's office have the burden of letting the left hand know what the right
hand is doing .. '" Id. at 262. The dissenters in Burbine adhered to this position, stating that
'[o]bviously, police should be held responsible for getting a message of this importance from one
officer to another." Burbine, 475 U.S. at 461 n.46 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
62. See note 51 and accompanying text.
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A. The Specifically Retained, Physically Present, and Requesting
Access Requirements
In People v. Griggs,63 the Illinois Supreme Court rejected
Burbine and created a rule requiring the police to inform a suspect of
an attorney's efforts to contact him. 64 In Griggs, the defendant was
arrested and taken to the police station for questioning. 5 Griggs tele-
phoned his sister from the station; she told him that she had retained
an attorney for him.66 That evening, the attorney arrived at the police
station, identified himself as Griggs's attorney, and stated several
times that he wished to speak with his clientY.67 The police denied the
attorney access to Griggs until nearly three hours later; however, by
that time, Griggs had signed a statement, including a waiver of his
Miranda rights.66 The court held that Griggs's waiver was invalid be-
cause it did not satisfy the knowing requirement. 69 In reaching this
holding, the court established the rule that to effect a valid waiver of
Miranda rights under the Illinois constitution's provision against self-
incrimination, the police must inform a suspect of his attorney's efforts
to contact him if: (1) the suspect knows that an attorney has been
retained for him, (2) the attorney is physically present at the police
station before the conclusion of the interrogation, and (3) the attorney
requests access to his client.70
This rule fails to provide future courts or police departments
with any guidance because it is too specific; future cases in which the
facts differ even slightly will need new and independent evaluation.
Furthermore, it is difficult to see how the requirement that a suspect
know that an attorney has been retained for him before compelling
the police to tell him of his attorney's attempts to contact him furthers
Miranda's goal of dispelling the inherent coercion of incommunicado
custodial interrogations. All suspects should be informed of an
attorney's efforts to contact them, but those who are unaware that an
attorney has been retained are especially in need of this information
because they will be more susceptible to police coercion than a suspect
63. 152 M1. 2d 1, 604 N.E.2d 257 (1992).
64. The Supreme Court of minois created a similar rule, based on the Fifth Amendments
self-incrimination provision, in a pre-Burbine case, People v. Smith, 442 N.E.2d 1325 (I11. 1982).
Because Burbine eliminated the federal constitution as grounds for such a rule, Griggs reaffirmed
Smith on state constitutional grounds in light of Burbine. Griggs, 604 N.E.2d at 269.
65. Griggs, 604 N.E.2d at 258.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 259.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 270.
70. Id. at 269-70.
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who knows a specific attorney is available to represent him.7'
Therefore, the suspect who is unaware that an attorney has been
retained for him needs to be informed of an attorney's efforts to reach
him. Examination of other states' experiences reveals further
deviance from Miranda's principles and additional flaws in the
reasoning of the state courts in their attempts to stay true to
Miranda.
In People v. Wright72 the Michigan Supreme Court held that
the defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights was not made knowingly
or voluntarily. After being arrested and taken to the police station,
the defendant waived his Miranda rights and confessed to the
charge.73 The defendant never was informed, however, that his grand-
father had retained an attorney for him who was present at the police
station and had attempted to contact the defendant.74  The court
stated that the critical question was whether the information the
police withheld would have changed the defendant's understanding of
the circumstances of a waiver.7 5 The court held that the police must
inform a suspect of a retained attorney's in-person efforts to contact
him,76 reasoning that Wright would not have waived his right to
silence if he had known that a retained attorney was waiting for
him.
77
This reasoning is inconsistent, however, with the narrow rule
that the Wright court announced. The court appeared to recognize
that the Miranda Court was concerned with any factor that could
affect a defendant's decision to succumb to police coercion but then
crafted a rule that is too limited to protect against these factors. Two
problems are readily apparent with this statement and the Wright
court's resulting rule. First, it seems that a defendant could be
equally hesitant to waive his rights if he knew that an attorney only
had telephoned the station and told the police that he would be at the
station shortly; therefore, the court's requirement that the attorney be
physically present at the station is illogical. Second, it is irrelevant to
the defendant whether the attorney was retained by a family member
or was, for instance, a Public Defender who learned of the defendant's
71. The Oregon Supreme Court remarked: "To pass up an abstract offer to call some un-
known lawyer is very different from refusing to talk with an identified attorney actually available.
... A suspect indifferent to the first offer may well react quite differently to the second." State v.
Haynes, 288 Or. 59, 602 P.2d 272, 278 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 945 (1980).
72. 441 Mich. 140, 490 N.W.2d 351 (1992).
73. Id. at 356. After arrest, the suspect agreed to give the police a statement. Id.
74. Id. at 353.
75. Id. at 356.




situation and came to the station of his own volition to assist the sub-
ject. In both scenarios, an attorney is immediately available to assist
the defendant, a circumstance that could affect a defendant's decision
to surrender his rights-yet the rule in Wright does not protect a
suspect in the second scenario.
B. Eliminating the Physically Present Requirement
Several states have designed rules that address at least one of
these oversights yet still stray from Miranda's ultimate goal. In
Bryan v. StateT7 and State v. Stoddard,79 the Supreme Courts of
Delaware and Connecticut held the defendants' waivers of their
Miranda rights invalid under similar circumstances. In both cases, an
attorney retained for the defendant telephoned the police station
attempting to contact his cient,8o and the defendant was not informed
of his attorney's efforts.81 The courts reached similar holdings,
requiring the police to inform a suspect of a specifically retained
attorney's efforts to contact him, if the attorney made a reasonable,
diligent, and timely attempt to provide legal services to his client .8 2
The Connecticut court, however, declined to adopt a per se rule of
excluding waivers obtained upon the failure of the police to fulfill this
duty. Rather, it held that a waiver under these circumstances will be
excluded if, based on the totality of the circumstances,m the informa-
tion withheld by the police likely would have changed the subject's
understanding of the circumstances.84 The facts of these cases and the
rules announced demonstrate that the courts did not intend to limit
their holdings to efforts made only by attorneys actually physically
present at the station; therefore, these courts have made better
attempts than others to stay true to the concerns of the Miranda
Court.
Most recently, the Supreme Court of New Jersey designed a
similar rule in State v. Reed.85 The police failed to inform Reed that an
attorney retained for him was physically present at the prosecutor's
78. 571 A.2d 170 (Del. 1990).
79. 206 Conn. 157, 537 A.2d 446 (1988).
80. Bryan, 571 A.2d at 173-74; Stoddard, 537 A.2d at 449.
81. Bryan, 571 A.2d at 174; Stoddard, 537 A.2d at 450.
82. Bryan, 571 A.2d at 175; Stoddard, 537 A.2d at 450-51.
83 The factors to be considered under this totality-of-the-circumstances test include the
relationship of the suspect to the attorney, the nature of counsel's request, the extent to which the
police had reasonable notice of counsel's request, and the suspect's conduct. Stoddard, 537 A.2d
at 456.
84. Id.
85. 133 N.J. 237, 627 A.2d 630 (1993).
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office and had requested to speak with Reed while he was being ques-
tioned. 6 The court held Reed's confession invalid, reasoning that the
police withheld information that was essential to a knowing waiver of
the privilege against self-incrimination. 87 The court stated that the
police have a duty to inform the suspect when an attorney makes it
known that he has been retained to represent the person held in
custody, is present or readily available, and makes a request to con-
tact the suspect in a reasonably diligent and timely manner.8 This
rule requires the police to inform the suspect even when a retained
attorney has only telephoned the police and requested to speak with
the suspect. Thus, the New Jersey, Delaware, and Connecticut courts
have formulated rules that address factors that concerned the
Miranda Court-but were neglected by other state courts.
The rules created by these states, however, are limited by a
requirement that appears unrelated to any goal or concern of
Miranda, and the courts failed to provide a reason for imposing the
particular limit. The rules impose a duty on the police to inform the
suspect only if the attorney expressly requests access to the subject.
The Miranda decision, however, focused almost exclusively on the
suspect's perspective. The Miranda Court was concerned with inform-
ing the suspect of his rights and dispelling any coercion he may feel in
attempting to exercise them. More specifically, the secrecy and in-
communicado nature of custodial interrogation, with the suspect's lack
of knowledge of events occurring outside of the interrogation room
that may have an effect on his decision to succumb to police coercion,
particularly troubled the Miranda Court.89 Therefore, it is difficult to
see the logic of a rule that imposes a duty to inform the suspect only if
the attorney expressly requests access to his client. To fulfill the goals
of Miranda, the police should be required to inform the suspect even if
the attorney did not specifically request access to the suspect.
As noted earlier, the mere fact that a specific attorney is avail-
able to assist the defendant immediately is a factor that may have
great significance -to a defendant in jeopardy of waiving his constitu-
tional rights.90 Therefore, requiring an attorney to do any more than
merely state his willingness to assist the suspect seems an unneces-
sary obstacle to the suspect's exercise of his constitutional rights.
86. Id. at 633.
87. Id. at 647. This privilege against self-incrimination is based upon New Jersey's common
law because the state constitution has no such provision. Id. at 637.
88. Id. at 644 (quoting Stoddard, 537 A.2d at 454).
89. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455-56.
90. See note 71 and accompanying text.
90519941
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
C. Easing the Requesting Access Requirement
The Supreme Court of Oregon has created a rule that lessens,
but does not eliminate, the requirement that an attorney expressly
request access to the subject. In State v. Haynes,9' an attorney re-
tained for the defendant telephoned the police station and stated that
he was representing the defendant and was coming to the station to
see his client.92 Because the police failed to inform the defendant of
the attorney's call, the court held the defendant's waiver of his
Miranda rights invalid on the grounds that it was neither knowing
nor intelligent93  The Oregon court did not require the attorney
specifically to request contact with his client; the duty to inform the
suspect of his attorney's call arose merely upon the attorney's
statement that he was coming to the station. The Oregon Supreme
Court's rule gives slightly greater effect than others to the Miranda
Court's concern over external events that could influence a suspect's
decision to succumb to police interrogation. 94 However, one state court
has gone even further and-accordingly is the only one that appears to
give full effect to the principles and goals underlying Miranda.
V. THE NEW YORK RULE: FINALLY THE RIGHT BALANCE STRUCK
ALONG THE RIGHT SCALE
New York is the only state with a rule that adequately ad-
dresses the Miranda Court's core concern. Although many other
states provided the subject with an increasing amount of information
regarding external events, New York created a rule that affected what
was occurring behind the closed door to the interrogation room.
Because other states tried to help suspects but never took that crucial
step through the interrogation room door, they have left the subject as
isolated as before. New York recognized that, to fully protect a
subject's Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimina-
tion, the balance must be struck in favor of the subject not increas-
ingly as a matter of degree, but rather of kind.
91. 288 Or. 59,602 P.2d272 (1979).
92. Id. at 273-74.
93. Id. at 277.
94. One commentator has explained that "the [Oregon] rule serves the purpose of providing
the suspect with information that materially changes the circumstances and options of the
suspect, thus allowing the suspect to make a truly intelligent waiver." Pascual, 20 Creighton L.
Rev. at 140 (cited in note 48).
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A. The Rule of People v. Arthur
1. New York Follows Mirandds Advice
In People v. Arthur, 9 New York created a rule instructing that
after a subject is under custodial interrogation and an attorney has
entered the proceeding, the subject is permitted to waive his Miranda
rights only in the presence of the attorney.96 If the subject already has
waived his rights and an attorney later enters the proceeding, the
subject must re-waive them in that attorney's presence before
questioning may continue.97 Therefore, once an attorney enters the
proceeding, the police must cease all questioning until the attorney is
present, regardless of what the subject desires. No requirements exist
that the attorney be retained specifically for the subject, request
access to the subject, or instruct the police to cease questioning.98 This
extremely broad rule provides the ultimate protection to a subject
with only the slightest of triggers, and it gives full effect to the
concerns and reasoning in Miranda. Therefore, it is a rule that the
Miranda Court would embrace.
The New York rule gives great weight to Miranda's encour-
agement to the states to adopt their own, more protective means of
decreasing the coercion of incommunicado interrogation and securing
a subject's constitutional rights.9 9 The New York court recognized its
power, and perhaps duty, to follow the lead and advice of the Supreme
Court and provide its residents with greater protection than that
provided by the Supreme Court itself.
More importantly, however, the New York rule recognizes the
vital role that attorneys play in the criminal justice system and en-
sures that after an attorney enters the proceeding, no incommunicado,
private questioning can occur without the attorney's presence. This
holding addressed Miranda's central concern and what it considered to
be the greatest possible evil of interrogation. 10° In fact, the New York
rule gives effect to what the Miranda Court itself indicated could be
the best possible method of reducing coercion-to have an attorney
present in the interrogation room.10 1  An attorney eliminates the
95. 22 N.Y.2d 325, 239 N.E.2d 537 (1968).
96. Id. at 539.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 538-39.
99. See note 20 and accompanying text.
100. See notes 9-16 and accompanying text.
101. See note 22 and accompanying text. In addition, the New York Court of Appeals has
expressed its "belief that the presence of an attorney is the most effective means we have of
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incommunicado nature of the interrogation and therefore eliminates
the coercive aspects that troubled the Miranda Court. In addition, the
New York rule contains none of the nonsensical restrictions and
qualifications that plague the rules of other states.
10 2
2. Recognizing the Relation Between Coercion and Rationality
The New York rule ultimately allows the subject not only to
make an informed and uncoerced decision to speak, but also to make a
rational decision. Although the Fifth Amendment, by its language
alone, does not appear to address an irrational decision to speak, this
subpart asserts that a rational decision is, by necessity and logic, part
and parcel of a truly uncoerced decision. If a subject is not informed
by his attorney of all the possible options, strategies, and pleas legiti-
mately available to him within the criminal justice system, then any
choice he makes, by definition, will be coerced to some degree. 103
Therefore, if the police inform a subject that his options are either to
tell the truth or remain silent, his decision still will be compelled to
the extent that he is unaware of, for instance, the relevance under the
law of certain mitigating or aggravating circumstances, or the law's
recognition and acceptance of plea bargains. A subject's view of the
relevant truth, and therefore of what he perceives to be his options
about whether to speak, may be affected by facts that he does not
know.
minimizing the disadvantage at which an accused is placed when he is directly confronted with
the awesome law enforcement machinery possessed by the State." People v. Cunningham, 49
N.Y.2d 203, 400 N.E.2d 360, 363 (1980).
102. The New York rule does not require that the attorney: (1) be retained specifically for
the subject, (2) request access to the subject, (3) instruct the police to cease questioning, or (4) be
physically present at the station-restrictions that do not further any goal of Miranda. See Part
IV.
103. This concern over a subject's ignorance is very real; one commentator has noted that
early confession cases "almost invariably concerned situations in which police questioned
relatively unsophisticated suspects." White, 39 Vand. L. Rev. at 7 (cited in note 14). He further
states that 'if the suspect is not aware of his right to remain silent, then at least from the
suspect's perspective, his answers would be compelled because he might believe that his only
alternative was to answer the questions asked by the police." Id. at 5. Another commentator has
stated that "the heart of the problem is the suspect who does not know his rights, who believes
that the police are entitled to make him talk.... [S]ince such a suspect thinks he is obliged to re-
spond, his answers are 'compelled' in violation of the fifth amendment privilege." Schulhofer, 54
U. Chi. L. Rev. at 454-55 (cited in note 9) (emphasis in original). Finally, the Supreme Court has
cited with approval the assertion that "a situation in which persons are required to contest a
serious accusation but are denied access to the tools of contest is offensive to fairness and equity."
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 n.13 (1964) (citing the Report of Attorney General's
Committee on Poverty and the Administration of Federal Criminal Justice 10-11 (1963)).
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Although the Miranda decision did not provide a subject with
an opportunity to make a rational choice, 0 4 it deliberately and
conspicuously encouraged the states to do so. Lines must be drawn in
all areas of the law, and the Miranda Court chose to draw its line at
the point of informing the subject that he has the right to an attorney.
The Court, however, expressly noted that the states have the power
and authority to draw their own lines, and New York has done
precisely that, drawing its line at a point that fully recognizes the
underlying goals of Miranda.10 5 Therefore, all states, both those that
have never before addressed the issue as well as those that have
attempted but failed to create rules that effect the goals of Miranda,
should adopt the New York rule because it strikes the ideal balance
envisioned by Miranda.
B. Policy Concerns in Adopting the New York Rule
1. A Vague and Unworkable Standard
The Burbine majority expressed concern that adopting any rule
that requires the police to inform a subject of the presence of an attor-
ney would be unworkable and undesirable because it would muddy
Miranda's clear waters., °' Twenty-five years of experience, however,
104. The Court in Miranda did express, however, its belief in the importance of a rational
decision. In discussing Escobedo v. Illinois, the Court stated that "Itihe entire thrust of police
interrogation there, as in all the cases today, was to put the defendant in such an emotional state
as to impair his capacity for rational judgment." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 465.
105. There is, however, a potential slippery slope concern that could hopelessly blur the line
that New York has drawn. A brief examination of the competing concerns that function to
counterbalance the rule, however, clarifies this potential blur. Because a rational decision is an
essential component of an uncoerced decision, it inay be necessary for a subject to be provided
with all possible options and strategies by the most qualified attorney available to ensure that the
decision is truly rational. Although this approach clearly is an impractical, if not impossible, rule,
the ultimate rationale of Miranda and the New York rule would seem to require this result.
However, one must recognize that both Miranda and Arthur struck their balances as they did in
consideration of the competing interest of effective law enforcement. If protection of the subject's
constitutional rights was the sole concern of our society, New York logically could require that the
best attorney provide each subject with every possible option available. Effective enforcement of
our laws, however, is as essential as protecting the rights of those accused of violating them.
Thus, the New York court simply has drawn its line further in favor of the subject and still
preserved a sensible and workable limit to the protection.
106. See notes 49-50 and accompanying text. The dissent in Burbine remarked, "For a police
officer with a printed card containing the exact text that he is supposed to read, perhaps the rule
is clear." Burbine, 475 U.S. at 461 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In addition, several commentators
have noted a contradiction within the opinion regarding this concern over clarity. One scholar
has suggested that the Court's rationale that such a rule will muddy Miranda's clear waters
should be contrasted with the Court's analysis of the fourteenth amendment due process
clause, in which it was apparently less concerned with developing a standard that clearly
specified interrogation procedures.... [I]n order to conduct an interrogation consistent
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have proven that the New York rule is no muddier than Miranda has
proven to be. Miranda generated litigation surrounding the defini-
tions of custody and interrogation, as well as the manner and
language of a valid waiver.0 The New York rule also has created
litigation surrounding the meaning and scope of some of its terms, but
courts have found resolutions to these issues.
a. When an Attorney Has "Entered the Proceeding"
First, although the New York rule is quite broad on its face, the
courts have imposed reasonable limits on the meaning of its language.
For instance, in People v. Kaye,10 8  the defendant's attorney
surrendered the defendant to the police.1°9 While the attorney was
standing only thirty feet away, the police placed the defendant in the
squad car; the defendant then immediately blurted out incriminating
statements without having been asked a single question. 10 Although
an attorney clearly had entered the proceeding, the New York rule
simply did not apply to freely volunteered statements because
Miranda only was concerned with interrogation.,, Therefore, despite
the potentially broad language of the New York rule, the courts have
imposed limitations on its ability to impede effective law
enforcement. 112
The New York courts have been confronted with, and resolved,
other gray areas about when an attorney may be considered to have
entered the proceeding for purposes of invoking the New York rule.
For instance, in People v. Castro,"3 the court held that when a juvenile
with due process, the Court requires both the police and prosecutors to act in a manner
that will not "shock the sensibilities of civilized society." After the Court developed this
nebulous standard, it failed to establish guidelines which would more clearly define con-
duct that shocks society's sensibilities.
It is unrealistic to expect police investigators to determine which methods of inter-
rogation conform to such an abstract standard.
Lynch, Note, 34 Wayne L. Rev. at 352-53 (footnote omitted) (cited in note 54). Another
commentator has observed that, in Burbine, "no indication was given as to the type of conduct
that might cause such an abridgment [of due process]." Laura Antonelli, Note, Moran v. Burbine:
The Decline of Defense Counsel's "Vital" Role in the Criminal Justice System, 36 Cath. U. L. Rev.
253,284 (1986).
107. See notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
108. 25 N.Y.2d 139,250 N.E.2d 329 (1969).
109. The defendant's attorney telephoned the police station and directed them to the location
of the murder victim's body. Id. at 329. The police then proceeded to a hospital where both the
defendant's father and attorney surrendered the defendant to the officers. Id.
110. Id.at330.
111. Id. at 331-32.
112. The court therefore recognized and gave deference to its statement that *[t]ruly
voluntary confessions constitute a highly trustworthy type of evidence." Id. at 332.
113. 462 N.Y.S.2d 369 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1983).
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subject attempts to contact his parents, the officer should interpret
those attempts as a request to consult with his parents, which for a
juvenile is the equivalent of requesting counsel.14 Therefore, under
these circumstances, the New York rule applies.115
Furthermore, in People v. Lee, 1 6 the court held that the right to
counsel, and therefore the New York rule, is invoked if a request for,
or statement of intent to obtain, an attorney is made to a third party
and overheard by the police.117 Finally, in People v. Stroh",, and People
v. Hodge,119 New York courts held that unless the subject has declined
unequivocally the assistance of counsel, a subject's request for a priest
may be the functional equivalent of invoking the right to counsel and,
consequently, the New York rule.120 Therefore, although the parame-
ters of the requirement that an attorney "enter the proceeding" are
not clear from the language alone, it has proven a workable standard;
the New York courts have resolved many difficult issues surrounding
the meaning of the term.
b. Period of Time the Police Are Required to Wait
The New York rule raises the question of how long the officers
are required to cease questioning and wait for the attorney to arrive
at the station. In People v. Lee, the police overheard a suspect's
statement made to a third party of his intent to obtain an attorney;
because this functions as an invocation of the right to counsel and of
the New York rule, the police were required to wait a "reasonable"
114. Id. at 371, 377.
115. In People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203, 400 N.E.2d 360 (1980), the court held that
once a subject has invoked his right to counsel, the New York rule applies, and he may not
subsequently waive that right in the absence of counsel. Id. at 364.
116. 589 N.Y.S.2d 263 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1992).
117. Police arrested the seventeen-year-old on the premises of his high school in the
presence of his parents and the principal. Id. at 264-65. The principal told the parents in both the
subject's and officers' presence that the subject had the right to an attorney and that they should
be sure to obtain one. Id. This exchange conveyed to the officers that while they were taking the
subject to the police station, the parents would be obtaining an attorney to join them at the
station. Id. at 265.
118. 408 N.Y.S.2d 77 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978).
119. 44 N.Y.2d 553,378 N.E.2d 99 (1978).
120. In Stroh, the subject stated, "Hold it, I would like to either have an attorney or a priest
to talk to, to have present." Stroh, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 78. When the officer asked, "Who do you
want?,' the subject replied, "Contact a priest down in the Parish, in Beacon." Id. The court
expressed concern that the subject may have believed from this exchange that, unless he knew of
a specific attorney, his only option was to ask for a priest with whom he was acquainted. Id. at 80.
In Hodge, the court cited with approval the lower court's suppression of the defendant's statement
made during an interrogation that had proceeded wrongly without the summoning of a priest
whom the defendant had requested. Hodge, 378 N.E.2d at 101.
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period of time for an attorney to arrive at the station.1 21 Although
"reasonable" is always a vague and manipulable standard, New York
courts, and other state courts that follow the New York rule, should
use the factors that Connecticut uses under its totality-of-the-
circumstances test to determine what time period is reasonable.1 22
These factors include the exact behavior and words of both the
attorney and suspect, the nature of the relationship between the
attorney and suspect, and the extent to which the police had notice of
the subject's request for an attorney. 123 For example, in Lee, the fact
that the officer who overheard the statement regarding counsel
provided the subject's father with the precinct's telephone number to
enable the attorney to call could weigh in favor of a broad
interpretation of reasonableness.124 Conversely, the opposite
interpretation might result when the subject possesses a dishonest
motive. 125  These factors appear to be practical and relevant to
determine what is reasonable when attempting to balance society's
interest in efficient law enforcement with the subject's interest in
having an attorney present during the interrogation.
c. Procedure Regarding a Separate, Unrelated Charge
Finally, one of the questions that troubled the Burbine major-
ity and contributed to its refusal to adopt a rule like New York's was
whether police may question a subject on a charge for which no
attorney has entered the proceeding if they know that he is
represented by counsel on a pending but unrelated charge.'2 6 For
nearly fifteen years, the courts of New York have answered that
question "no."127 The courts first were confronted with the issue in
People v. Rogers.128 The Rogers court held that the police may not
121. Lee, 589 N.Y.S.2d at 267.,
122. See note 83 and accompanying text. In State v. Stoddard, 206 Conn. 157, 537 A.2d 446
(1988), the court held that if the police fail to inform a subject that a retained attorney is
requesting access to him, the subject's waiver of his rights and subsequent confession will not be
excluded per se, but rather the determination will be based on the outcome of a totality-of-the-
circumstances test. Id. at 456.
123. Id.
124. Lee, 589 N.Y.S.2d at 265.
125. See, for example, People v. San Souci, 260 N.Y.S.2d 967 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965). At the
defendant's sentencing hearing, he claimed that he was represented by a new attorney. Id. at
969. The judge presiding over the hearing attempted to reach the new counsel's office and waited
over an hour for an attorney to appear. Id. The court found that the defendant was engaging in a
delay tactic and held that a one-hour wait was reasonable. Id. at 970.
126. See note 49 and accompanying text.
127. The dissenters in Burbine agreed with this position, noting that it was a *quite simple
question[ ]." Burbine, 475 U.S. at 460-61 & n.46.
128. 48 N.Y.2d 167,397 N.E.2d 709 (1979).
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question a subject on a charge for which he is not officially
represented if the police are aware that he is represented on another
charge.129 The court expanded its rule only two years later in People
v. Bartolomeo.130 In Bartolomeo the court held that when the police
are aware of the prior charge, they have an obligation to inquire
whether the subject is represented on that charge and will be held
accountable for whatever knowledge they would have obtained
through this inquiry. 13' Therefore, the New York courts have
confronted and resolved many of the issues, both specific and general,
that troubled the Burbine Court, successfully striking the balance in a
manner that demonstrates that this rule is neither unmanageable nor
hopelessly vague.
2. Burdening Law Enforcement
Another likely criticism of the New York rule is that it strikes
the balance too much in favor of the subject, thereby hampering law
enforcement efforts. In fact, many of Mirandds critics have argued
that the Miranda decision's costs are far too great to justify the
decision's rule, let alone a broad expansion of it. Their primary
allegation is that Miranda has led to a decrease in the number of
confessions that police obtain,132 resulting in the loss of an invaluable
tool without which many cases will remain forever unsolved;
therefore, many critics have called for the decision to be overruled.'
There are several reasons, however, why Miranda should remain
intact and the broader New York rule be adopted universally.
First, if fewer subjects are providing confessions with Miranda
in place, it is highly likely that the Miranda Court's concerns were
well-founded and its solution well-crafted. The compulsion to confess,
identified by the Miranda Court, likely has been dispelled successfully
to some degree by the provision of the Miranda warnings. Therefore,
this data suggests not that Miranda should be overruled but rather
129. The court reasoned that "[a]n attorney is charged with protecting the rights of his client
and it would be to ignore reality to deny the role of counsel when the particular episode of
questioning does not concern the pending charge." Id. at 713. This protection has been limited to
the situation in which the subject is represented on a pending charge only because the court's
concern is that the subject could incriminate himself on the pending charge, for which he is
represented, although the questions supposedly are directed only toward the unrelated charge.
Once the subject has been tried and convicted and is represented only for purposes of appeal,
however, the state simply does not have the same motivation to gather incriminating evidence.
People v. Colwell, 65 N.Y.2d 883, 482 N.E.2d 1214, 1215 (1985).
130. 53 N.Y.2d 225, 423 N.E.2d 371 (1981).
131. Id. at 373,375.
132. See, for example, Markman, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 946 (cited in note 5).
133. See id. at 948-49.
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that it is functioning precisely as intended: to protect a subject's
constitutional rights. Therefore, because Miranda appears to have
identified a real concern and taken the first step toward addressing it,
the extension of Miranda through the New York rule is simply a
greater step in that same direction. The Miranda Court perceived the
greatest coercion to be inherent in the incommunicado nature of most
interrogations but created a rule that stopped short of eliminating this
incommunicado nature. Therefore, the New York rule, which requires
that an attorney be present in the interrogation room before a subject
validly may waive his rights or make a statement, appears to be a
logical next step toward dispelling the coercion that the Miranda
Court correctly identified.
Second, although reliable confessions are undeniably beneficial
to effective law enforcement, and it is politically and socially unpalat-
able to support a rule that demonstrably reduces the number of crimi-
nals who admit guilt, the Fifth Amendment dictates that result. Its
plain, unambiguous language prohibits the state from compelling an
individual to be a witness against himself.134 An individual cannot
truly incriminate himself unless he is guilty; therefore, the Fifth
Amendment operates from the perspective of a guilty subject. It
makes the value judgment that the state may not force a guilty sub-
ject to speak against himself, regardless of the resulting effect upon
law enforcement. Thus, neither Miranda nor the New York rule is
intended to provide a vehicle for freeing criminals; rather, they both
simply carry out the Fifth Amendment's commands.
Furthermore, Miranda's supporters dispute the accuracy of
the data showing an alleged decrease in confessions and its
interpretation. Additionally, their own interpretations and
explanations of the data favor adopting the New York rule. First,
some have cited studies showing little decrease, or none at all, in the
number of confessions obtained by police since Miranda.35 If these
studies are accurate, then states certainly should adopt the New York
rule because the studies indicate that Miranda in its present form is
not achieving its goal of reducing the coercion to confess. If this is the
case, perhaps providing the Miranda warnings is no longer a means to
an end but instead has become an end in itself, a duty perfunctorily
discharged in a monotone, void of any sense of the constitutional
134. See note 2.
135. See White, 39 Vand. L. Rev. at 19 n.99 (cited in note 14), for examples of post-Miranda
studies showing little or no decrease in the confession rate. Another supporter has explained
that, although there may have been decreases in confessions immediately following Miranda, they
were all very short-lived and the rates have returned to their pre-Miranda levels. Schulhofer, 54
U. Chi. L. Rev. at 456 (cited in note 9).
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import of the words.136 If so, then a rule consisting only of conveying
information to the subject cannot succeed in a mission to protect his
constitutional rights; a rule that requires concrete action, like the New
York rule, should be adopted to ensure the use of a method that will
succeed in dispelling coercion. 137
Second, some Miranda supporters have acknowledged that it
has led to a reduction in the number of confessions but argue that this
reduction has had no impact on law enforcement because the
conviction rate has remained steady. 13s This position implicates a
conclusion identical to that discussed above in response to allegations
by Miranda's critics that the decision has decreased the number of
confessions: Miranda has dispelled successfully some of the coercion it
identified and should be expanded further to dispel the compulsion a
subject may feel that might cause a violation of his Fifth Amendment
right.
Finally, one commentator has attempted to dispute the reliabil-
ity of a study indicating that Miranda has decreased the confession
rate by asserting that the study was plagued by a sampling bias. A
post-Miranda study found a significant decrease in the confession
rate; however, the authors explained that this result could be attrib-
uted to the use of officers who were "particularly conscientious" in
complying with Miranda.19 This biased result would appear to be the
strongest argument of all for expanding Miranda's requirements
because it demonstrates that when Miranda is adhered to and
136. The Court in Miranda worried about precisely this situation and advised, 'The
requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is a fundamental with respect to the Fifth
Amendment privilege and not simply a preliminary ritual to existing methods of interrogation.'
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476.
There is, of course, another possible interpretation of data showing no decrease in the number
of confessions since Miranda that should be addressed. It is possible that there simply never was
any coercion for the warnings to dispel and, if that is the case, one may inquire what Miranda's
purpose is. One commentator has responded:
The answer is that procedure matters. The fifth amendment does not protect individuals
from conviction, but from a certain method of conviction, and the differences in method
are important.... For those concerned only with the "bottom line," Miranda may seem a
mere symbol. But the symbolic effects of criminal procedural guarantees are important;
they underscore our societal commitment to restraint in an areas in which emotions easily
run uncontrolled.
Schulhofer, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 460 (cited in note 9).
The Supreme Court itself appeared to agree with this position, citing with approval the
comment that "[t]he quality of a nation's civilization can be largely measured by the methods it
uses in the enforcement of its criminal law." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 480 (quoting Comment, Walter
v. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 26 (1956)).
137. One commentator has agreed, stating that 'the proper critique of Miranda is not that it
'handcuffs' the police but that it does not go quite far enough. Miranda's safeguards deserve to be
strengthened, not overruled." Schulhofer, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 461 (cited in note 9).
138. See, for example, White, 39 Vand. L. Rev. at 17-18 (cited in note 14).
139. Id. at 19.
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respected most closely, it most fully achieves its goal of dispelling the
compulsion to speak against oneself. Therefore, those states with
officers who are not particularly conscientious in complying with
Miranda should adopt the New York rule. Because it effects a change
in the type of information provided to the suspect, rather than simply
increasing the quantity, it is not as easily manipulated into a lower
status through careless or indifferent compliance. Similarly, even
those areas that have applied Miranda conscientiously and have
successfully dispelled some coercion should adopt the New York rule
because it can only serve to dispel further the coercion prohibited by
the Constitution. Thus, the arguments of both the critics and
supporters of Miranda counsel for widespread adoption of the New
York rule because it more fully protects a subject's constitutional
rights in a manner that is manageable and does not impose an
unacceptable burden on law enforcement.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the Miranda warnings are a firmly ingrained and
accepted aspect of the criminal justice system, taught by television
shows to most members of society before they even understand the
meaning of the words they have memorized, one must not become
content simply to accept Miranda in its present form. The Court was
concerned primarily with the coercion inherent in incommunicado
interrogation; the roadside recital to which one is accustomed falls far
short of addressing that concern. Miranda created a Fifth
Amendment right to counsel and required the police to inform the
subject of that right, encouraging states to adopt greater protections if
they deemed them necessary. Many states attempted to follow this
suggestion but traveled the wrong path, providing a flow of
information to the subject that led right up to the interrogation room
but never affected the ultimate privacy and secrecy of the
interrogation itself. New York is the only state that has adopted a
rule that fulfills Mirandds goals; by requiring attorney-subject contact
in the interrogation setting, it both protects the right to counsel and
eliminates the incommunicado nature of the questioning. Whether
the confession rate has decreased or remained the same, and whether
Miranda is applied conscientiously or has become a meaningless
ritual, policy concerns counsel for widespread adoption of the New
York rule, which has struck a manageable balance for over twenty-
five years.
Lorraine J. Adler
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